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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 7176

HOWARD S. BYINGTON,

Defendent and appellant.

Brief of· Respondent
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Howard S. Byington, having been
tried before the District Court of the First Judicial District in and for the County of Cache, State of Utah, was
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found guilty by verdict of the jury of Perjury in the
Second Degree and sentenced therefor by imprisonment
in the Cache County jail, Logan, Utah, for a term of one
year. It is from the verdict and sentence that he appeals.
The record discloses, by State's exhibit "C", that
a Decree of Divorce was entered on the 9th day of May
1947, dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between
one Howard S. Byington the Appellant and one Lavina
Byington ; and that by the provisions of the Decree Mrs.
Byington was awarded custody of the four children of the
parties and $50.00 per month for their support and maintenance, payable on the 20th day of May 1947 and each
month thereafter. A further sum of $1.00 per year was
awarded to Lavina Byington as alimony, payable June
1, 1947 and annually thereafter.

j

State's exhibit '' C'' further reflects that on or about
the 26th of November 1947, Lavina Byington filed an
Affidavit in which she set forth as a fact the failure of
the Appellant to make the payments as ordered and further that ''His failure to pay said sums has been willful
and intentional.'' Lavina Byington, in the aforesaid affidavit, prayed that the Court enter an order directing
the Appellant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for failure to make aforesaid payments.
The order was issued by the Court on or about the 26th
day of November 1947 and was regularly heard by the
Court on the 8th day of December. At the hearing Lavina
Byington appeared personally and was represented by
her counsel. The Appellant appeared without counsel.
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The Court heard the testimony of Lavina Byington as
to her information concerning the Appellant's inconw
since the making of the Decree and also the Appellant
was questioned at that time by counsel for Mrs. Byington and by the Court in respect to his earnings and failure to pay alimony.
It was during the course of these proceedings on
the Order to Show Cause that the Appellant, among other
things, was questioned as to whether or not he had remarried and the Appellant answered "yes". He further
testified that he was married in the state of Montana
but that he did not know of the exact time or place. His
recollection concerning the marriage was so hazy that
the Court asked:

''Where is your
Answer:

wife~''

''Home.''

Court: ''Hasn't she been able to tell you
where you got married~''
Answer:

''Well, I guess she could.''

Court: ''Then I'm going to give you just
about five minutes to get down there, Mr. Byington, and bring her back here. We'll take a recess
for about ten minuteS' so far as this case is concerned, and you may go with the Sheriff and bring
her back.''
(Page 56, State's Exhibit "B ")
The Appellant returned a few minutes later and was
again questioned regarding his marriage and he again
testified that he was married and that he did not know
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the time or place but that the marriage was entered into
in the state of Montana. (Pages 56 and 57, Plaintiff's
Exhibit "B").
It was upon this testimony concerning marriage
following the Decree of his divorce from Lavina Byington that the Appellant was charged and convicted of the
crime of Perjury in the Second Degree.
PROPOSITION NO. 1
QUESTIONS !CONCERNING MARRIAGE WERE PROPER
AND PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

Counsel for Appellant, in his brief, argues that the
question of whether or not the Appellant was married
was collateral and incidental as far as the issues in the
proceedings were involved, had nothing whatsoever to
do with Byington's default in alimony payments, and
no materiality in the determination as to whether or not
the Appellant should he punished for contempt.
It may be conceded that this argument is correct,
as far as the premises therein are involved; however, it
is the position of the Respondent that the information
would be pertinent to the Court in the final determination as to the disposition to be made of the matter before
him. That is to say the Court, with the decree standing of
record and the failure of the Appellant to obey the decree, may have no alternative but to find that the Decree
had been vi<;>lated and, following questions concerning the
activities of the Appellant, determine the Appellant to
be in contempt. Nevertheless the court had an additional
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determination to make and that is to the extent of the
punishment to be meted in accordance with the facts and
circumstances.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
marital status of the Appellant would be pertinent and
that the Court was justified in going into the domestic
situation of Byington as 'Yell as his economic condition.
This proposition js well supported under the law. See
Hillyard Ys. District Court of Cache County 68 Utah
220, 249 Pac. 806 and ""\Yatson vs. Watson, 72 Utah 218,
269 Pac. 775. In the Watson Case this Court held:
"(1) The particular question here, however,
arises upon the contention of defendant that the
finding made by the court does not warrant or
support the judgment of imprisonment which
was entered against him. It is argued that a finding of present ability to comply with an order is
an essential prerequisite to an order that the delinquent be imprisoned until he does comply. In
support thereof the following cases are cited: Ex
parte Silvia, 123 Cal. 293, 55 P. 988, 69 Am. St.,
Rep. 58; In re Cowder, 139 Cal. 244, 73 P.
156; Lutz vs. District Court, 29 Nev. 152, 86 P.
445; Ex parte Hamberg, 37 Idaho, 550, 217 P.
264--to which may be added our own decision in
Hillyard vs. District Court (Utah) 249 P. 806.
The judgments considered in the cited cases
were all coercive in form and purpose and intended to compel the payment of money by the
delinquent, by an order of indefinite imprisonment until the payment was made. To support
such a judgment in contempt it is clear that it
should first appear that the act sought to be
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coerced was yet within the power of the person
proceeded against to perform. It would be repugnant to reason and futile to order a person imprisoned until he did some particular thing, unless
he had the present ability to do it.''
Section 104-45-10 Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides as follows :
"Upon the answer and evidence taken the
court or judge must determine whether the person
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt
charged, and if it is adjudged that he is guilty of
the contempt, a fine may he imposed upon him
not exceeding $200, or he may he imprisoned in
the county jail not exceeding thirty days, or he
may be both fined and imprisoned.''
It is evident that the court must exercise a discretion as to the punishment to be imposed and, therefore, he
has a right to inquire into the circumstances of the party.
See also 48 C. J. 833, Perjury, paragraph 33:
''A statement can be neither material nor
immaterial in itself, but its materiality must be
determined in accordance with its relation to
some extraneous matter. False testimony relative to a non-existent issue cannot he material.
But any statement which is relevant to the matter under investigation is sufficiently material to
form the basis of a charge of perjury. The test of
materiality is whether a false statement can influence the tribunal - not whether it doe's.''
48 C. J. 832, paragraph 32:
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·'At conunon law and under statutes preserving the common law rule in this res:pect, a false
statement must be material to the issue or question under consideration in order to constitute
perjury. Irrelevant testimony although false, cannot be made the basis of a charge or perjury; nor
will a false. oath as to superfluous and immaterial matter sustain an indictment for this offense.
Under statutes changing the common law rule
in this respect materiality is not an element of the
crime of perjury. Citing: State vs. Miller 26 R.I.
282, 58A. 882; State vs. Byrd, 28 S.C. 18, 4 SE
793, 13 AJ.n. SR660; Reg vs. Ross, 1 Montr. ( Q.B.)
Que 227.
(a) 1n second degree perjury materiality is
not necessary. State vs. Wilson 83 wash 419, 145
P. 445.''
PROPOSITION NO. 2
THE STATEMENTS INVOLVED WERE VOLUNTARILY
MADE

Appellant urges in his brief that the question of marriage was incriminating and in vj olation of the protection
afforded a witness under Article 1, Section 12 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section 105-1-10
Utah Code Annotated 1943.
The proceedings before the Court, in which this
charge arose, were civil in nature and in furtherance of
civil process. It was proper and within the jurisdiction
and power of the Court to summon the Appellant before
him and with Byington present iri Court, question him
concerning his failure to pay support money, attorney's
fees, and generally abide by the Court's Decree.
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Section 105-1-10, 1943, as cited by Appellant, is a
section of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. It is of
long standing in the common law system of jurisprudence
as a protection for those accused of a crime. Byington
was not accused. He was a participant in a civil procedings. The Order to Appear and Show Caus·e was in the
nature of proceedings supplementary to execution in
civil matters.
There is a distinction between criminal and civil
Contempts. In 17 C.J.S. 7, the following appears:
''A criminal contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the
court, or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
Criminal contempt may arise in the course of

a criminal action, in special proceedings, or in
civil or priV'ate litigation.
The line of demarcation between acts constituting criminal and those constituting civil
contempts is very indistinct. The confusion in
attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts
is due to the fact that there are contempts in
which both elements appear. In general, contempts of court for which punishm·ent is inflicted
for the primary purpose of vindicating public
authority are denominated criminal, while those
in which the enforcement of civil rights and remedies is the ultimate object of the punishment
are denominated civil con tempts; whether or not
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a fine or inprisonment is imposed is not a distinguishing test.
Civil Conten1pt consists in failing to do
something· ordered to be done by a court in
a civil action for the benefit of an opposing party
therein, and is therefore, an offense against the
party in whose behalf the violated order is made.
If, however, the contempt consists in doing a forbidden act, injurious to the opposite party, the
contempt may he considered criminal.''
This Court has held in the case of Foreman vs. Foreman,-Utah-176 Pac. (2d) 165 at 168 as follows:
"\Ye believe that ~Ir. Justice Stone, in the
case of Lamb vs. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, at page
:220, 52 S. Ct. 315, at page 316, 76 L. Ed. 715, sets
out clearly and concisely the rule ror determining
the nature of such procedings. He said:
•***The fine or the incarceration ordered
in conjunction with the relief afforded the
litigant is considered secondary to the granting of that relief even though it has the effect
of vindicating the authority of the Court. In
each of these two cases, the party litigant
who is the beneficiary of the Court's Order
is interested in the result thereof, and in case
of an appeal is interested in upholding the
Court's Order in order to establish and/or
satisfy his rights.' "

It is therefore respectfully submitted that Byington
was neither before the court in the status of an accus·ed,
nor compelled to incriminate or give evidence against
himself. H,e did not stand charged with a crime.
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Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides in part, ''The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; ***" and it
is this provision of our Constitution under which the
privilege against self-incrimination arises.
As a filatter of fact, the honorable district Court in
the proceedings. below, and this Court is not and should
not be concerned with the nature of the testi~ony given,
that is, whether or not it was privileged or improperly
received as the fundamental issue is whether or not
Byington perjured himself before the Court.
The authorities, generally speaking, are not in accord :;:ts to the practice or procedure which should be
followed either by the court, counsel or witnesses when
an incriminating qu~stion is submitted for answer. Generally speaking experience has shown that the witness,
to say the least, is in a rather perilous position. If he
answers the question he may subject himself to prosecution. If he refuses to answer he may find himself
guilty of direct contempt for his refusal, and if he counsels with the Court he places himself in a degrading
posiHon. His dilemma must depend upon the decision of
the Court as to whether or not his answer would be incriminating. See Vol. 8, Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd
Edition, Pg. 304, Paragraph 2251 et seq.
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition Vol. 8, Page
851 discusses the r.ule of law tothe effect it is not for
the witness to determine if the question is incriminating
and the great weight of authority holds that the court
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must decide if a question is material or pertinent to the
issue. These are held the prerogative of the inquisitor.
~Ioreover, the privilege is ''an option of refusal and not
a prohibition of inquiry.'' See vVigmore on Evidence,
Vol. 8, page 389. This last mentioned rule has been discussed and adopted by this Court. In State vs. Thorne
39 Utah 208,117 Pac. 58, it is stated:
''The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that a
defendant, in a criminal case, becoming a witness,
may be cross-examined the same as any other
witness. He, like any other witness, may be asked
many questions wholly irrelevant. and collateral
to the issue, for the purpose of testing his memory, affecting his credibility, and the weight of
his tHstimony. When a question is asked which
relates to incriminating acts, or calls for evidenc:e
of an incriminating character, separate and distinct from those on trial or testified to by him,
he, like any other witness, may claim the privilege
and decline to answer it. The prevailing opinion
in this country is that it is for the court, and not
the witness to determine whether the evidence
called for by th'e qustion propounded may or not
tend to incriminate the witness.''
Bearing in mind the foregoing principJes of law, it is
difficult to rationalize the position of the Appellant concerning the propriety of the questions in the first instance. All that was asked of the Appellant was whether
or not he was married, and he promptly answered, ''yes.''
The Court then went on to ask when he had been married
and, as submitted in Proposition 1 of this Brief, it is the
position of the Respondent that such evidence would be
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pertinent to the disposition of the case because, by knmYing when the marriage took place, the Court would have
some rule to determine how long he had been married.
The Appellant would have a reviewer of this cause jump
to the conclusion that when the questions were asked in
the first instance the Court then had reason to believe
such questions self-incriminating. Certainly such a conclusion cannot be gleaned from the record. To say the
least, it does not imply immoralit:.T to ask a man if he is
married, that he will defame himself by answering, or
subject himself to punishment for a crime.
Counsel cites authorities to the effect that the Court
should warn the 'vitness and advise him of his privilege.
Again there is no indication that the Court was aware of
any necessity for so doing should such be the law. Byington perjured himself. Upon making the discovery of this
possibility, the court gave him adequate time to reconsider the questions submitted, even to the extent of requesting that he produce his wife. In 41 American Jurisprudence, page 8, it is stated:
"A false statement made in Court under fear
or compulsion constitutes perjury, since the impelling danger is not present, imminent, impending or unavoidable.''
The Appellant now 'submits to this Court that Byington falsified before the Court be-cause he knew he would
incriminate himself if he told the truth, and that any answers made to these incriminating questions, as so called,
were made in ignorance of constitutional privileges and
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as a consequence any privileg-e which he failed to exercise could not be considered as waived. See 28 R.C.L.
430, paragraph 16.
The foregoing proposition submitted by the Appellant would bear son1e weig-ht and consideration were
Byington being charged with a crime as a result
of the information received in the course of the proceedings; that is, a crime concerning his marriage or failure
to marry. Then, and in such instances, the question of
waiver of privilege would be material. The issue before
this Court is not the admissibility of information against
the accused, but rather, whether or not having been sworn
and placed under oath, he deliberately falsified.
PROPOSITION NO. 3
TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED

According to the record, as set forth in the Appellant's Brief, prior to the trial of this case, attorney for
the Appellant filed application and petition for a change
of judge. Upon the affidavit of the Appellant to the
effect that the presiding judge, before whom the action
was pending, was prejudiced against him and that the
defendant believed said judge would not grant him a fair
and impartial trial.
It is respectfully submitted that this is the only
indication of record that there was any doubt concerning the ability of the Court to hear the matter fairly. The
affidavit, which at the most states a conclusion of the
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Appellant, is the only evidence that the Judge was either
biased. or prejudiced.
A review of the record and pages 3 to 15 of the transcript discloses that in the selection of the jury the court
absolutely insured that the Defendant would be afforded
a fair trial. Nowhere in the proceedings does it appear
that this attitude changed during the course of the trial.
This court has repeatedly held that the motion seeking
to disqualify a trial judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice is addressed to the discretion of the judge. He
must decide the motion the same as any other matter
which comes before him. 11 usser vs. Third Judicial District Court, 106 Utah 373, 148 Pac. (2d) 802. An affidavit stating that the judge is biased and prejudiced
does not. show disqualification. Cox vs. Dixie Packing
Co., 72 Utah 236, 269 Pac. 1000. See also Haslam vs. Morrison-Utah-190 Pac. (2d) 520 and Willie vs. Local
Reality Co.-Utah (April 28, 1948).
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the
jury in this matter was based upon evidence which conclusively shows the guilt of the accused. Byington after
disregarding an order of court, committed what may
have been found to be a crime in living with another
party ·without the sanction of a marriage ceremony.
Then when questioned by the Court concerning apparent
disobedience to his order, he .perjured himself. ·Thereafter Byington attempts to gain a privilege by belately
arguing that he would inncrimiate himself by answering
truthfully. The judgment and conviction should he affirmed.

GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General of Utah

ANDREW JOHN BR.ENNAN,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys fior Plaimtiff and
Respondent.
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